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Abstract 
KADIDLO, LUKÁŠ. Fiscal Federalism: Eurozone Budget and Its Stabilization Func-
tions. Brno, 2015, 38 p. Mendel European Centre, Mendel University in Brno, CZ. 
The main goal of this working paper is to design Eurozone budget that would be able to 
perform stabilization function and thereby help Eurozone member states overcome 
temporary asymmetric shocks in times of financial and economic crisis. This is quite a 
new, attractive and frequently discussed topic in the scientific community. The litera-
ture overview includes description of principle of fiscal federalism and up-to-date sci-
entific articles dedicated to stabilization function of a budget, European budgetary 
structures and other issues relevant for the Eurozone budget design. 
Section results contains concrete steps to design Eurozone budget, namely identifica-
tion of its size and also description and quantification of individual revenues and ex-
penditures of the Eurozone budget. Eurozone unemployment scheme consisting of Eu-
rozone payroll tax and unemployment benefits represents autonomous and the most 
important part of the budget. In this working paper, also net gainers and net contribu-
tors of the Eurozone unemployment scheme are calculated and analyzed. The identifi-
cation of net gainers and net contributors of the Eurozone unemployment scheme is 
what makes this article unique and special. Eurozone budget is commented and ana-
lyzed as a whole in recommendations and discussion and a few important topics of fur-
ther research are identified in the conclusion of this working paper. 
Keywords 
Eurozone, stabilization function of a budget, Eurozone budget, payroll tax, unemploy-
ment benefits, tax from financial transactions, Eurozone stabilization fund. 
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1 Introduction 
In 2007, the financial crisis began in the United States of America. Later on, it spread 
out of the US to the whole world. Europe and particularly Eurozone has been hit by the 
economic and financial crisis quite severally. The whole European Union has suffered 
from recession and some countries of the Eurozone, namely Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Ireland and Spain have undergone severe economic problems caused by a typical 
asymmetric shock and are still having big problems in fighting the economic crisis. Un-
fortunately, European budgetary structures have not been designed to perform stabili-
zation function during financial and economic crisis and Eurozone was therefore not 
prepared to perform stabilization function for the member states in need. Greece, Por-
tugal and Ireland have been receiving financial support from other Eurozone members 
or from IMF in order to keep off the danger of default. During the crisis, lack of stabili-
zation function has been discovered and this issue was addressed by quickly creating 
stabilization mechanisms that did not have a form of a budget. Financial aid to above 
mentioned countries came from European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) 
that has been activated for Ireland and Portugal for a total amount of 48.5 billion EUR 
in the years 2011 – 2013 and from European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) that was 
created as a temporary rescue mechanism for the ensuring financial stability in Europe. 
In 2012, new and permanent mechanism for crisis management called European Sta-
bility Mechanism (ESM) was created. ESM should replace EFSM and EFSF and be the 
main tool in fighting financial difficulties in the Eurozone. With a maximum lending 
capacity of 500 billion EUR, it has a much higher amount of capital for rescue opera-
tions. In contrast to European Union, the United States of America has managed to 
come out of the financial and economic crisis better and smoother since the US GDP 
has been growing since the year 2010. The decline of American GDP occurred in 2008 
and in 2009 but after that the American GDP has been growing again. Similarly, Euro-
zone firstly entered recession in the 2009. However, after a mild GDP growth, Euro-
zone has entered recession again in 2012 and up until the end of 2013 the GDP of the 
Eurozone has been declining. (1), (2), (3) 
In this working paper I would like to take a close look at how the stabilization 
function could be embedded into European budgetary structures in order to fight fu-
ture financial and economic crisis. The outcome of this working paper should be a func-
tioning Eurozone budget based on an unemployment scheme that performs stabiliza-
tion function for the Eurozone in times of economic crisis. Also, net gainers and net 
contributors of the unemployment scheme should be quantified and analyzed. Creation 
of Eurozone budget does not mean that the EU budget should be abolished. The func-
tion of the EU budget is completely different than the functions of the proposed budget 
of the Eurozone so the creation of the Eurozone budget does not have any influence on 
the budget of the European Union. 
In the literature overview, scientific articles important for the design of the Eu-
rozone budget are stated. Methodology contains information about how the budget is 
exactly computed, sections results and recommendations include description and in-
terpretation of revenues and expenditures of the budget and discussions and conclu-
sions include overall evaluation of the budget and topics for further research. 
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2 Literature overview 
This sections includes most important articles and papers dedicated to the topic of EU 
budgeting and Eurozone budget. 
2.1 EU Budget: the need to use an aggregate approach 
In the following paragraphs, benefits of adopting an aggregate approach1 in the Euro-
pean finances are described. Using aggregate approach means having a clear picture of 
public finance at the European level. The first benefit is that aggregate approach allows 
us to see and analyze overall level of public spending in the European Union and ena-
bles to better assess main financial priorities. Moreover, aggregate information about 
European public spending help indentify key sectors where political cooperation on 
European level can be strengthened. Additionally, using aggregate approach it is possi-
ble to compare central and national public spending of EU and other countries. Based 
on such comparison and fully functioning fiscal union, recommendations for the Euro-
pean Union can be derived. The current state of multi-level structure of public finance 
in the European Union is in certain areas very different from the structure of public 
finance in the United States, Switzerland or Canada. In the following paragraphs and 
figures, central and national public finance of the EU will be compared and confronted 
with the public finance in the US, Switzerland and Canada. These three countries have 
been chosen from the following reasons. First of all, these countries are fiscal federa-
tions with the comparable economic advancement as the advancement of Eurozone. 
Secondly, these have also firstly created monetary union and after that a fiscal union. 
The third reason for comparison with US, Switzerland and Canada is the fact that it 
enables comparison with both very centralized fiscal federation (United States) and a 
very decentralized structures with large autonomy of lower levels of government (Swit-
zerland and Canada). (4) 
From the table 1, it can be seen that public spending in total in the EU is higher 
than public spending in US, Canada and Switzerland. It can be clearly seen that the EU 
is exceptional in very low central public spending reaching only 1 % of the GDP. All 
three benchmarks have public spending between 10 and 25 % of their GDPs. In other 
words, we can state that EU budget is extremely small and that EU national budgets are 
in contrast very big (45 % of the GDP). So member state budgets cover almost 98 % of 
the total public expenditures in the European Union. (4) 
Table 1: Public spending at total and central level as a % of GDP (2008) 
 EU US Canada Switzerland 
Total public spending 46 % 33 % 37 % 34 % 
Central public spending 1% 25 % 22 % 11 % 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, (4) 
                                                 
1 In this context, aggregate approach means deepening national and European coordination in 
public spending, increasing multi-level governance and thereby using the public expenditure in 
a more powerful way. 
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The huge difference in sizes of central budgets can be also clearly seen in the figure 1. 
The figure show that European budget is simply too small to be able to finance areas 
that are usually and predominantly financed by central public spending. In the US and 
Canada, social welfare is predominantly financed from central budgets. On the other 
hand, in case of the EU it is entirely financed from the national or regional budgets. 
Same pattern can be seen in the expenditures for research and development and exter-
nal relations where European budget fails to finance these areas despite the fact that 
these areas are financed centrally in the other federations. (4) 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of spending for social welfare in 2008 as a % of tot. public spending 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, (4) 
Heterogeneity among member states of the European Union is the main obstacle in 
centralizing spending under the budget of the European Union. The larger the hetero-
geneity is, the more complicated it is to create any common European policy. For in-
stance, the heterogeneity in health care system or social welfare is substantial which 
means that centralizing spending in these areas at a European level is not very proba-
ble. On the other hand, some issues where member states tend to have similar strate-
gies such as environmental policy would be suitable for the central financing from the 
European budget. 
2.2 Lessons from the Crisis for the EU Budget 
This section is based on ideas and articles by Sebastian Dullien and Daniela Schwartzer, 
professors at HTW Berlin and Hertie School of Governance respectively. In 2009, when 
the European Union was hit by the financial and economic crisis, national governments 
created extensive stimulus packages to help overcome the impacts of the crisis. Howev-
er, such stimulus packages lacked coordination on a European level and stabilization 
efforts of countries such as Spain or Ireland were hindered by increased market pres-
sure on their bond interest rates. As a result, the economic downturn of the Eurozone 
was made worse and unfortunately, the European Union had no means to prevent such 
6 Literature overview 
situation. Economic differences in the Euro Area played an important role in causing 
the periphery countries very sensitive to the crisis. The above mentioned development 
discovers a need to re-think and redesign fiscal stabilization mechanisms in the Euro-
zone. The reason behind this is that individual member states fail to run successful sta-
bilization policies themselves and therefore a centrally organized fiscal stabilization 
tools have to be put into operation in the Eurozone. (5), (6), (7) 
Stabilization function of the EU budget requires changes both on the income 
and expenditure side of the budget. On the income side, new financial resources are 
needed to ensure the stabilization function. These resources could be achieved through 
common EU taxes, for instance EU corporate tax or EU income tax. Introducing a pro-
gressive personal income tax would probably provide the best stabilization effect. How-
ever, it is important to mention that introducing a progressive income tax on the Euro-
pean level would be extremely complicated if not impossible due it big differences in 
national tax systems. Also, this solution is for the time being not politically acceptable. 
Therefore, the EU corporate tax would be the second best possible solution. It would 
perform the role of cyclical source of revenue and additionally, it would also allow in-
troducing a minimal level of taxation and thereby restricting the inner tax competition 
among the member states low tax rate states like Ireland that subsequently receive fi-
nancial aid from the states with higher level taxation such as Germany. Similarly to the 
federal system of states in the US, common European corporate tax would limit the 
harmful tax competition and simultaneously still allow a certain degree of the competi-
tion. (5) 
However, it is very important to state that common corporate income tax on a 
European level is almost impossible to be achieved in the near future from the follow-
ing reasons. The biggest obstacle for creating a common European corporate tax is the 
absence of harmonization and calculations of tax bases across individual member 
states. Furthermore, in some countries corporate income tax is related with personal 
income tax. So for such member states, creating European corporate tax would also 
mean influencing the personal income tax. Removing the above mentioned obstacle 
and harmonizing the tax bases across Eurozone would be a very long and complicated 
process and no political will exists to pursue this process further in the near future. 
From the reasons stated above, common corporate income tax will not be taken into 
account while designing the revenues of the Eurozone’s budget because it is simply not 
realistic and it would be incredibly hard to quantify the possible revenues from such tax 
as there are differences in tax systems and calculations of tax bases in individual mem-
ber countries. (8) 
Last but not least, a so called pillar of automatic stabilization should be put into 
operation.2 This could be introduced by European unemployment insurance scheme to 
support the national unemployment systems of the member states which us also cur-
rently discussed at the European level in the European Commissioner for Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion Mr. Lászlo Andor. Member states would still manage their 
unemployment system and European scheme would just help diminish effects of cycli-
                                                 
2 Automatic stabilization means a system which stabilized temporary asymmetric shocks of 
member states. 
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cal unemployment. For all employees in participating countries, a certain level of pay-
roll tax estimated to be in the amount of 2 % should be collected. From the money col-
lected by the European unemployment scheme, employees who paid the European pay-
roll tax for more than a year would be allowed to receive benefits up to half of their last 
salary for the period of 6 to 12 months. The European unemployment scheme would 
partly replace the national systems but these would still be in operation reflecting the 
national differences and social security systems. Such system would perform stabiliza-
tion function since people in regions severely hit by the economic crisis would receive 
support from a financial pool to which employees from all member states contribute. 
Therefore, this scheme would help decrease asymmetric shocks and fight cyclical un-
employment only. The overall amount of financial resources required to achieve signifi-
cant stabilization effects in the unemployment insurance does not have to be very big. 
According to the American economist Lawrence Chimerine, US unemployment insur-
ance is said stabilize approximately 15 % of GDP fluctuations under only about 0.4 % 
move of GDP each year. (5) 
The stabilization function of the budget needs to address not only discrepancies 
among individual regions but also across time. In order to ensure this, the Eurozone 
needs to be allowed to build up financial reserves in economic upswings and use them 
in time of economic downswings. However, it is important to consider the political as-
pect of financial aid given to the member states in a downturn period. There is a danger 
that countries would not use the given aid to fight economic crisis. Countries suffering 
from very high deficits might use the additional funds for budget consolidation in order 
to have the possibility for additional spending or tax cuts just before the next elections 
which would not serve the primary purpose of business cycle stabilization.  
The problem is that the European budget was never designed to have a stabiliz-
ing function but already the Treaty of the European Union containing the principles of 
achieving the convergence of the economies has indicated a possible stabilization func-
tion of the European institutions. The degree of redistribution in the most of the Euro-
pean countries is relatively high and therefore it does not make sense to create a brand 
new tax that would increase the tax burden. Therefore, the only option is to transfer 
part of the tax revenues from the member states to the Eurozone budget. (5) 
The next paragraphs are dedicated to Eurozone and the reasons why it might be 
reasonable to have a common budget of the Europe's monetary union. 
2.3 Missing stabilizers in Eurozone 
At the time when Eurozone was created, stabilizing mechanisms at a level of the mem-
ber countries have been to some extend abolished since member states have lost their 
autonomy in monetary and exchange rate policy and their central banks have lost a role 
of the lender of last resort since countries issue debt in a common currency that is un-
der a control of the European Central Bank. So countries cannot guarantee anymore 
that cash will always be available to pay out the bonds at maturity. Economists suggest 
that fiscal union would increase a stability of the Eurozone. Paul de Grauwe stated that 
“Euro is a currency without a country” and that “Eurozone without a common budget is 
like a house without a protecting roof”. (9) In order to bring stability into the Eurozone, 
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a country should be created and basic pillar of a country is a central authority that is 
able to collect taxes and use financial resources for spending in the scope of the whole 
union. This is connected with substantial federal budget. However, this process suffers 
from very limited willingness of national states to transfer the right to collect taxes to 
the European institutions and also a problem of moral hazard. Since there is no politi-
cal will to make substantial and fast steps towards the fiscal union, a policy of small 
steps should be performed. (9), (10) 
2.4 A budget for Europe’s monetary union 
Usually, federations have substantial federal budget that exercises important budgetary 
functions at the central level. Eurozone is technically not a federation but it has com-
mon fiscal rules and policies that have developed as a response to the financial and 
economic crisis in order to enable countries better overcome country specific shocks 
under conditions of monetary union. What is more, there have been some ideas regard-
ing the more integrated budgetary framework for the Eurozone since the stabilization 
function works better while performed at the federal level. If a federation-wide shock 
occurs, the stabilization measures should be done by the federal budget. If the shock 
occurs in all national economies simultaneously it tends to be inadequately resolved by 
the national policies. The main reasoning behind this is that national governments tend 
to rely on fiscal response of the neighboring countries and hesitate to provide big 
enough response and want to become free-riders or policies of neighbors. If no strong 
coordination mechanisms among regional fiscal policies exist regional fiscal policy is 
weaker than the federal one. Another important role of federal budget is the provision 
of federal public goods such as security, environmental issues etc. However, most of 
federal public goods in Europe are connected with the European Union and its single 
market and not with Eurozone. (11) 
The Eurozone budget should be designed under the principle of distributional 
neutrality which means there should be no net transfers in a certain given period. In 
other words, there could be net transfers to a state negatively influenced by the eco-
nomic shock but in the long run the net received payments of such state should be 
equal to zero. Only temporary shocks should be compensated and no permanent shocks 
should be created. Organization of Eurozone’s budget revenues is another important 
issue to be addressed. Revenues might either flow from the national budgets of the 
member states or they could be collected in form of some European tax. If revenues 
should be used as a stabilization instrument, they should be somehow linked to income 
or consumption. Richer countries should contribute with the greater extent than less 
developed countries since they would require larger support in case of an economic 
crisis. The principle of solidarity is established in the European Union from the very 
beginning and Eurozone budget should also reflect this principle. Therefore, contribu-
tions on per capita basis do not seem very reasonable. (11) 
Finally, the Eurozone budget should be made for all Euro countries plus all 
countries with fixed Euro exchange rate and countries that are in the process of prepa-
ration for Euro acceptance. In order to fight substantial and wide economic shocks and 
stabilize the economy, Eurozone should be able to borrow money on the capital mar-
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kets. However, a possible misuse of federal financing could lead to increasing federal 
debt without any boundaries and problem of misusing. From this reason, strict limits 
on federal borrowing should be introduced. One possibility to do this is to impose a rule 
of structural balanced budget or to establish an independent institution controlling the 
new budget and federal borrowing. (11) 
2.5 Creating Eurozone budget as a stabilization tool 
During the recent financial end economic crisis, the idea of creating a separate budget 
for the Eurozone has been created and possible features of Eurozone budget have been 
discussed. The crisis has already given an incentive to create financial instruments such 
as European Financial Stability Facility and European Stability Mechanism. These in-
struments have been created in order to provide financial support Eurozone countries 
that are suffering from liquidity crisis. However, it is important to say that these in-
struments do not have a structure and design of a budget which is composed by reve-
nues and expenditures. These are rather intergovernmental instruments providing 
money to Eurozone countries that are having troubles with borrowing on capital mar-
kets. One of the main functions of newly created Eurozone budget should be the macro-
economic stabilization function. The budget should provide financial assistance to 
member states in case an asymmetric shock occurs. The funds should be exclusively 
reserved for the member states and the need for a cyclical adjustment is closely con-
nected to the fact that member countries of a common currency area have substantially 
reduced possibilities to stabilize their economies due to inability to use their own 
monetary and exchange rate policies. From this reason, countries outside Eurozone do 
not feel such an urgent need to be part of such insurance scheme since they can use 
their own monetary and exchange rate policies to help the economy achieve equilibri-
um. (12) 
If Eurozone budget should represent a tool for stabilization of cyclical shocks, it 
is important to prevent any permanent and unjustified and hidden transfers of finan-
cial resources because in such a case rich countries will not accept it. In order to pre-
vent this from happening, all member countries should contribute into the fund during 
economic boom. Secondly, the scheme for financial aid should work in a largely auto-
matic manner and distribute financial aid based on strictly objective criteria with no 
direct political influence. The criterion for instance might be a change in growth rate 
compared to other member states. Furthermore, the total amount a country could re-
ceive should be limited. If above mentioned conditions are met, the scheme should be 
balanced in the medium term. The budget should be financed by contributions from the 
national budgets of individual member countries. (12) 
2.6 Financial transaction tax 
The idea of common European tax from financial transactions came back to life after 
recent financial crisis. Due to a danger of global financial collapse, enormous financial 
injections have been put to the financial system by governments in order to prevent the 
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global financial system from collapsing. The financial system has been relatively suc-
cessfully stabilized but this stabilization brought a problem of huge costs to rescue fi-
nancial sector to be addressed. An absence of fair and substantial contribution of the 
financial sector that would cover costs of rescuing the financial system in times of fi-
nancial crisis was the key driving factor of European financial transaction tax. When 
the fair and substantial contribution of the financial system is missing member states 
are forced to raise taxes in other areas or to cut public spending in order to cover the 
costs necessary for financial system stabilization. Due to a perfect mobility of capital 
and growing internationalization of financial transactions and institutions, it is abso-
lutely necessary that the tax from financial operations is internationally coordinated in 
order to ensure effectiveness of such tax. (13), (14) 
Based on the information above, European Commission issued a proposal. The 
proposal has two major objectives was prepared for 11 member states of the Eurozone3. 
First objective is to harmonize indirect tax legislation. Second and most important ob-
jective is to establish fair and substantial contribution of the financial sector. The sec-
ondary objective is to create disincentives for certain financial transactions that do not 
support stability of financial markets. The proposal includes taxation of securities trad-
ing and derivates at two different rates. Trading of securities that includes trading of 
bonds and shares is to be taxed by 0.1 % of the market price and tax is paid by financial 
institutions that are involved in the transaction. The tax rate of derivate agreements 
was set to be 0.01 % of the notional amount underlying the product and is also paid by 
financial institutions involved. The tax from financial transactions is not applicable for 
private households and small and medium enterprises. The preliminary estimates of 
the budgetary implication of the financial transaction tax in 11 EU member states was 
estimated to be between 30 to 35 billion EUR per year. (14), (15), (16) 
2.7 Size of a budget performing stabilization function 
This section of the working paper is dedicated to discovering an optimal size of a budg-
et that would be able to perform a stabilization function. Below mentioned information 
will be used as a benchmark and basis for stating the size of Eurozone budget in the 
further pages of this working paper. 
2.7.1 MacDougall Report 
Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance in European Integration, more 
commonly known as so called MacDougall Report was written in 1977 by a group of 
independent economists who were asked by the European Commission to look at role 
of public finance at a European level. The report examines federal budget in the EU in 
three stages, namely pre-federal stage, later stage and full federation stage. For the 
purposes of this working paper, only pre-federal stage will be taken into account since 
current state of the Eurozone is most similar to the pre-federal stage and therefore in-
formation about this stage are the most relevant for the goal of the working paper. Fur-
                                                 
3 Member states requesting participation in European Union financial transaction tax: Austria, 
Belgium, Estonia France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia Spain 
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thermore, according to the restriction conditions of this working paper, only stabiliza-
tion function is taken into account and allocation function and redistribution function 
are out of the scope of this working paper. (18), (19) 
According to the report, the size of the common federal budget should be at least 
2% of the GDP in order to be able to play some role in the stabilization policy. In com-
parison to fully functioning federations as United States and Germany where the size of 
public expenditures on the community level were around 25% of the GPD, it is obvious 
that common European budget with size of just 2% of GDP could not fully and solely 
perform stabilization function itself and should be accompanied by stabilization func-
tions of the national budgets. The report suggests that the largest component of the 
budget would be used for equalization mechanisms between the weaker member states 
and richer member states and there would also be mechanism for supporting fight 
against unemployment. (18), (20) 
2.7.2 Size of European stabilization mechanisms 
The aim of this section is to find out, what is the overall size of non-budgetary Europe-
an stabilization mechanisms that have been created as a response to recent financial 
and economic crisis. The size will be measured as a proportion to GDP of the Eurozone. 
There exist three different stabilization mechanisms, namely the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Finan-
cial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM). 
Via EFSM, European Commission is able to borrow up to the amount of 60 bil-
lion EUR in the financial markets on behalf of the European Union that provides a 
guarantee from the EU budget. European Commission can subsequently lend borrowed 
money to the member states in need. European Union does not bear any costs connect-
ed to debt servicing since the loan is repaid by the member state that borrows money 
from the EFSM. European Union budget only guarantees the repayment of the loan in 
case the member state fails to service its debt and defaults. In the recent years, EFSM 
has been used for Ireland and Portugal and the total amount of borrowings to these two 
countries reach 48.5 billion EUR that have been distributed between the years 2011 and 
2013. (21) 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is currently the most important tool of the 
Eurozone to ensure and establish financial stability. Similarly to the EFSM, the purpose 
of ESM is to provide financial assistance to the members of Eurozone that experience 
financial difficulties. After the EFSF described below ceases to exist ESM will remain to 
be the only mechanism ensuring financial stability in the Eurozone. In order to fulfill its 
function, ESM issues debt with maturity of up to 30 years and member stated provide 
their contribution in the amount of 80 billion EUR to create an insurance mechanism. 
The member states of the Eurozone are also the shareholders of the ESM. The total 
lending capacity of the ESM is 500 billion EUR which is more than eight times bigger 
amount than EFSM. (22), (23), (24) 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) came into existence in May 2010 in 
order to provide financial help to the members of Eurozone under the framework of 
macro-economic adjustment program. However, it is important to mention that EFSF 
was a temporary mechanism and in 2012 it was replaced by permanent rescue mecha-
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nism ESM that is described above. EFSF issued bonds on capital markets and subse-
quently lent gathered financial resources to member states in need. EFSF could also 
take actions in both primary and secondary bond markets. The total capacity of the 
EFSF is 188.3 billion EUR of which 176.1 billion has already been used to predominant-
ly help Greece but also Portugal and Ireland. (25), (26) 
Table 2: Size of Eurozone’s stabilization programs in billion EUR 
Stabilization program Size in billion EUR 
European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) 60 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 500 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 188.3 
Source: Own elaboration, (21), (24), (26) 
Since EFSM and EFSF will cease to exist and ESM will be the only stabilization mecha-
nism in the future, EFSM and EFSF will not be taken into account while calculating the 
size of the European stabilization programs and only ESM will be considered to be the 
basis for calculation of size of the stabilization program. European Stability Mechanism 
has a capacity of 500 billion EUR. The GDP of the Eurozone at market prices in 2013 
was 9,574.4 billion EUR. So it can be easily computed that ESM equals to 5.22 % of the 
Eurozone’s GDP. (27) 
2.8 Unemployment benefits in EU member states 
This chapter of the working paper is dedicated to unemployment benefits in European 
Union and it is very relevant for the section results since unemployment support is con-
sidered to be one of the main expenditures of the Eurozone budget and information 
about existing unemployment benefits will serve as a starting point for establishing 
Eurozone wide unemployment benefit scheme financed from the Eurozone budget. 
Unemployment benefits in the European Union have two important aspects. The 
first one is the replacement rate which means how big the unemployment support is in 
proportion to the wage. The second important aspect is the duration which means for 
how long the unemployed person receives unemployment support. Based on these two 
indicators, together with the unemployment rates and average wages, an amount of 
total costs of unemployment benefits can be quantified which will be done in the sec-
tions results. 
The net replacement rates in the European Union vary substantially as it can be 
seen in figure 2. (28) 
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Figure 2: Net replacement rates in EU member states in 2010 
Source: (28) 
Portugal is the country with highest net replacement rates from all member states and 
the rate reaches 92 %. On the other hand, net replacement rate reaches only 12 % in the 
United Kingdom. All in all, we can say that most of the Eurozone countries have the net 
replacement rates around 60 % of the wage and this number will be used as a reference 
value for the section results of this working paper. The figure 2 also shows that net re-
placement in the Eurozone tends to be little bit higher than net replacement in coun-
tries that are not members of the Eurozone. (28) 
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3 Data and methods 
All the data needed for the design of the Eurozone budget are available at the at-
tachment of this working paper.  
For the purposes of the calculations, values and figures from the year 2012 are 
used because it is the most recent year when all the necessary data and information are 
available. A ceteris paribus condition is applied for the calculations and predictions of 
development of the data in the future years. It means that the changes of variables such 
as GDP, unemployment rate, wages, number of financial transactions and similar are 
omitted and left out from the model of Eurozone budget and it is always calculated with 
the data from the year 2012 and theses values are perceived to be fixed. 
First step is to determine the size of the budget. This is done based on articles 
and reports stated in the literature review of this working paper, namely based on cur-
rent European stabilization mechanisms that amount to 5.22 % of the GDP of the Eu-
ropean Union member countries and based on MacDougall report which states that the 
size of a budget that performs stabilization function should be at least 2% of the GDP. 
While taking into consideration these two values, the size of the Eurozone budget was 
set to be 3 % of the GDP of the Eurozone member states. 
The second step is to design and quantify Eurozone budget revenues. Based on 
the relevant scientific articles from the literature review, three sources of revenues were 
stated and quantified. The first source of revenue is contributions of national budgets of 
the Eurozone countries. Necessary data such as GDP of member countries in current 
prices and GDP per capita have been taken from the Eurostat and can be found on in 
the attachment of this working paper. GDP per capita serves as a coefficient for contri-
bution and includes the solidarity within the budgetary structure. It means that richer 
countries that have higher GDP per capita contribute more from their national budgets 
than countries that are poorer. The formula for computing the contributions of national 
budgets is following. The GPD in current prices of a country is multiplied by the coeffi-
cient for contribution (GDP per capita) and the result is multiplied by the contribution 
rate which was set out to be 0.9 %. This is the principle of the first source of revenue. 
The second source of revenue is Eurozone payroll tax. Again, data for computa-
tion of this revenue, namely productive population 15-65 in individual member states, 
unemployment rate and average annual wage have been taken from Eurostat. All the 
data come from the year 2012 which is the most recent year where all the necessary 
data have been available. From the productive population and unemployment rate, the 
actual number of employed people was easily computed. The payroll tax rate was set to 
be 2.5 % from the annual wage. So the second source of revenue is quantified as num-
ber of employed people times average annual wage times tax rate of 2.5%. 
Tax from financial transactions is the third and final source of revenue. The 
model of financial transaction was developed for 11 countries of the European Union 
and is stated in literature review of this working paper. Exactly the same model was 
applied for the Eurozone. The revenue coming from tax from financial transaction in 11 
countries was expected to be between 30 and 35 billion EUR. So the middle value of 
32.5 billion EUR was taken as a reference number and the model was applied to the 
whole Eurozone using GDP for the purposes of recalculation. 
Data and methods 15 
On the expenditure side, there is one main source of expenditure, namely un-
employment benefits. The calculation of unemployment benefits is the most complicat-
ed calculation done in this working paper. Data necessary for the computation have 
been taken from Eurostat and OECD and these data come from the year 2012 which is 
again the most recent year when all the data are available. From the productive popula-
tion and unemployment rate, the number of unemployed people in individual member 
states is computed. From the study dedicated to unemployment benefits in Europe 
done by European Commission that is described in literature review of this working 
paper, some important values have been taken over. Namely it is the average net re-
placement of 60 % of the average wage. The average unemployment duration of four 
months has been found in OECD data. 
So finally the unemployment benefits can be calculated as follows. Number of 
unemployed people is multiplied by four twelfths of the average wage because the aver-
age length of unemployment is 4 months. The product is further multiplied by 60 % 
since the net replacement rate was set out to be 60 % of the average wage. By doing so 
the annual expenditures for unemployment benefits are computed. 
There are also other expenditures not representing typical budgetary expendi-
tures that are paid out on an annual basis. Firstly, a Eurozone stabilization fund is to be 
created from the contributions of national budgets and revenues from financial trans-
actions. The size of this stabilization fund was stated to be 500 billion EUR based on 
already existing European stabilization mechanisms described in the literature review 
of this working paper. Under the ceteris paribus principle described above, the period 
necessary to filling up the Eurozone stabilization mechanisms. Annually the contribu-
tions of national budgets and tax from financial transactions bring 132.2 billion EUR to 
the stabilization fund so the fund will be filled up after 4.78 years. After this period two 
scenarios of Eurozone expenditures are created and described in recommendations 
section of this working paper. The detailed elaboration of these scenarios is out of the 
scope of this working paper so the scenarios should be considered to serve as an inspi-
ration for the further research. 
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4 Results 
In this section, individual steps are taken in order to create a budget of the Eurozone. 
In the framework of this working paper, the budget is primarily and exclusively de-
signed to permanently perform a stabilization function within the Eurozone member 
countries that would allow Eurozone to fight with future economic crisis more success-
fully than during last crisis that began in 2007. 
Before defining and computing individual sources or budget revenue, the size of 
the budget needs to be determined. This is done based on MacDougall report and size 
of currently existing stabilization mechanisms that are described in the literature re-
view of this working paper. As soon as the budget size is defined, individual sources or 
revenue are computed to meet the size objective. The revenue sources or the European 
budget are contributions of national budgets of the member states, Eurozone payroll 
tax, and tax from financial transactions. Subsequently, budget expenditures are quanti-
fied and calculated. Eurozone budget will use its revenues for unemployment benefits 
for unemployed people in the Eurozone and reserves for possible bail out or financial 
aid for member states in during economic downturn will be created and also for im-
proving the competitiveness of the net gainers of the Eurozone budget. 
4.1 Size of Eurozone budget 
Size of the Eurozone budget is determined on the basis of MacDougall report and size 
of ESM to the GDP of the Eurozone. The MacDougal report states that in pre-federal 
stage, the size of the budget should be at least two percent of GDP in order to perform a 
stabilization function. In section 3.7.2 all currently existing European stabilization 
mechanisms were summed up and expressed as percentage of Eurozone GDP. As a re-
sult, it was computed that European stabilization mechanisms represent 5.22 % of Eu-
rozone GDP. Based on the these two figures, value 3 % of GDP was taken as binding 
size of the Eurozone budget for further purposes of this working paper and calculations 
of revenues and expenditures.  
Table 3: Size of Eurozone budget based on 2012 data  
Eurozone GDP in 2012 (in billion EUR) 9,574.4 
Relative size of Eurozone budget 3 % 
Absolute size of Eurozone budget (in billion EUR) 285.2 
Source: Own elaboration, Eurostat 
Since both revenues and expenditures of the Eurozone budget will be stated in absolute 
values in monetary units, Table 3 was used to quantify the size of Eurozone budget in 
billion EUR. Since the Eurozone budget will be balanced, value 285.2 billion EUR will 
be targeted in both budget revenues and budget expenditures. 
Furthermore, it is important to mention, that the Eurozone budget will be de-
signed according to rule of no budget deficits (so called golden rule) which means that 
no budgetary deficit will be allowed in the Eurozone budget and this budget will always 
operate only with resources available from the obtained revenues. 
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4.2 Eurozone budget revenues 
This chapter of the working paper is dedicated to Eurozone budget revenues. Based on 
the literature review, three sources of budget revenue have been identified, namely con-
tributions of national budgets, Eurozone payroll tax and tax from financial transac-
tions. Each source of revenue is briefly described and then concretely quantified. Full 
data and calculation sheets can be found in the attachment of this working paper. 
4.2.1 Contributions of national budgets 
The first source of revenues comes from contributions of national budgets of members 
of Eurozone. The contributions are computed based on following principle. The basic 
value of this revenue is the GDP of a member state. From the very beginning, process of 
European integration has been based on principle of solidarity and this principle is also 
used in this source of Eurozone budget revenues. The idea behind it is that richer 
member states should contribute more than the poorer ones. The richness of individual 
member states is measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (PPS) 
from which a coefficient has been created by dividing the GDP per capita in PPS by 100. 
So if the member state has above average GDP per capita, the contribution from the 
national budget into the Eurozone budget is higher since the coefficient is greater 
than 1. Similarly, if Eurozone member state has below average GDP per capita, the con-
tribution from the national budget into the Eurozone budget is lower since the coeffi-
cient is smaller than 1. By means of this coefficient, contribution rate of individual 
member states will be adjusted. The contribution rate was set to be 0.90 % and this is 
multiplied by the coefficient measuring the richness of a country. The GDP of a particu-
lar member state is than multiplied by the adjusted coefficient and the result is the ac-
tual contribution of individual member state into the Eurozone budget.4 
Contributions are counted based on data from the year 2012 which is the most 
recent year with available data. The total revenues coming from the national budgets of 
Eurozone member states are 95.7 billion EUR which is almost exactly one third of the 
total budget size which means that this is a substantial source of revenue and an im-
portant part of the Eurozone budget. 
Figure 3 shows how much each member state contributes from the national 
budget into the Eurozone budget. As it can be seen, Germany is by far the biggest con-
tributor into the Eurozone budget contributing more than 30 % of the total contribu-
tions from the national budgets. Germany is followed by France, Italy and Spain with 
contributions 20.8%, 14.9 % and 9.3 % respectively. These four states contribute more 
than two thirds of the total contributions.  
On the other hand, contributions of member states such as Cyprus, Estonia, Lat-
via, Malta, and Slovenia are very low and insignificant. The total contribution of these 
five states does not even reach 1 % of the total contributions from national budgets. 
From these numbers and from the figure 3 it can be derived that the burden of 
revenues from the national budgets lies almost entirely on states as Germany, France, 
                                                 
4 All the data, formulas and detailed calalculations can be found in the attachment of this 
working paper. 
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Italy and Spain which is logical due to their size and advancement of the economies. It 
is important to mention that the richer and larger the member state is going to be the 
more money it is going to contribute to the Eurozone budget. 
 
Figure 3: Contribution from national budgets of individual member states in % based on 2012 
data 
Source: own elaboration 
Figure 4 shows the contribution from national budgets per inhabitants in productive 
age which is another interesting measure of evaluating contributions of individual 
member states of Eurozone. As it can be seen, Luxembourg has by far the highest con-
tribution per inhabitant but it is important to say that this values is not very relevant 
and can be omitted since the GDP per capita of Luxembourg is very high due to the fact 
that many people from another countries work in Luxembourg without having their 
residence there. Apart from that it can be seen, that countries such as Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands have their contributions between 550 
and 650 EUR. 
On the other hand, there is a number of countries whose contribution per inhabit-
ant is less than 300 EUR. These countries include Baltic countries, Cyprus, Greece, 
Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
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Figure 4: Annual contribution from national budgets in EUR per inhabitant based on 2012 data 
Source: own elaboration 
4.2.2 Eurozone payroll tax 
The most important revenue for the Eurozone budget is Eurozone payroll tax. This tax 
is a good tool for stabilization function of a budget since the logic behind it is following. 
Employees pay part of their wages or salaries to the Eurozone budget in form of the 
payroll tax and unemployed people than receive unemployment support from the Eu-
rozone budget instead of the national budgets. By establishing such system, Eurozone 
will be able to better react on asymmetric shocks and stabilization function in the Euro-
zone will be increased substantially. When there is asymmetric shock which means that 
for example in Germany the economy is growing and in Italy there is a recession, the 
unemployment in Germany decreases and unemployment in Italy increases. So in other 
words, Eurozone payroll tax revenues in Germany increase and unemployment support 
decreases. Exactly opposite scenario occurs in Italy where unemployment increases, 
Eurozone payroll revenues tax decrease and unemployment support increases. By in-
cluding payroll tax and unemployment support within the common Eurozone budget, 
increased revenues from Eurozone payroll tax in Germany will be in fact used for in-
creased demand for unemployment support in Italy which is exactly the purpose of 
stabilization function. Quantification of unemployment support is described in detail in 
chapter of the working paper that is dedicated to Eurozone budget expenditures. 
The quantification of Eurozone payroll tax is based on following data from Euro-
zone member states: population in productive age, unemployment and average annual 
wage. Number of employed people was easily computed from the population in produc-
tive age and unemployment rate. European payroll tax rate was set to be 2.5 % and the 
annual revenue from payroll tax was simply calculated as multiplication of employed 
people, annual average wage and Eurozone payroll tax rate as described in the method-
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ology and can be found in the attachment of this working paper. Altogether the reve-
nues from Eurozone payroll tax should reach 155.1 billion EUR.5 
Figure 5 shows relative shares of total contributions from payroll tax per mem-
ber state in percent. The distribution of this revenue is very similar to the distribution 
of the first revenue (contributions from national budgets) and again Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain are the main contributors to the Eurozone budget in form of payroll tax. 
However, in comparison to the distribution of the first source of revenue, it can be 
observed, that distribution of Eurozone payroll tax revenues is a little bit more equally 
distributed among the member states and the revenue burden on Germany is slightly 
lower (28.9 %) compared to the first source of revenue where it was 30.8 %. It is im-
portant to say that the distribution of contributions of individual member states will in 
fact change based on the change of variables such as unemployment, population etc. As 
it is written in the methodology of this working paper, changes in such variables are 
omitted in this working paper, condition of ceteris paribus is used and data from 2012 
are taken as constant in time. 
 
Figure 5: Annual revenues from Eurozone payroll tax per member state in % based on 2012 data 
Source: own elaboration 
4.2.3 Tax from financial transactions 
The last source of revenue of the Eurozone budget is tax from financial transactions. 
The quantification of this tax is done based on the proposal of the European commis-
sion that is described in the literature review of this working paper. The commission 
                                                 
5 All the data, formulas and detailed calalculations can be found in the attachment of this 
working paper. 
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proposed a tax rate of 0.1 % from the market price on trading of securities (bond and 
stares) and tax rate of 0.01 % from the derivate agreements. The proposal counted a 
membership of 11 EU countries in the system of financial transaction tax. The estimat-
ed revenue per year from this tax given that 11 EU countries would participate was es-
timated to be between 30 and 35 billion EUR. For the purposes of calculation of the 
financial tax for the Eurozone the middle value 32.5 billion EUR was taken as a refer-
ence value. 
The logic behind the computation is following. Values of GDP of 11 EU member 
states that were considered to be payers of tax from financial transactions have been 
summed up. Given that the estimated revenue from these 11 member countries is 
32.5 billion EUR, a proportion of this amount to the sum of GDPs of participating 
countries was calculated to be 0.38 %. After that, this rate was applied on the total GDP 
of the whole Eurozone and the revenue from tax from financial transactions was calcu-
lated. So the total annual revenue based on GDP values from 2012 was calculated to be 
36.5 billion EUR. In comparison to the first and second source of revenues, this reve-
nue is very small. It is important to say that tax from financial transactions has a sense 
only in case all Eurozone introduce it at once.6 
4.2.4 Total budget revenues 
In the previous paragraphs, tables and charts, three different sources of revenues have 
been described, namely contributions of national budgets, Eurozone payroll tax and tax 
from financial transactions. Altogether, all three sources of revenues equal to the 
amount of 287.3 billion EUR which is computed in the table 4. This amount is only 
slightly higher than given size of the Eurozone budget that was stated to be 3 % of the 
Eurozone GDP which equals to 285.2 billion EUR. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
above mentioned sources of revenues have successfully reached the stated size of the 
budget. 
Table 4: Share of individual revenues as a percentage of total revenues 
Budget revenue 
Revenues in EUR 
billion 
Share of revenues 
in % 
Contributions of national budgets 95.7 33,3% 
Eurozone payroll tax 155.1 54,0% 
Tax from financial transactions 36.5 12,7% 
Total 287.3 100,0% 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 6 shows the share of individual sources of revenues in the total revenues of Eu-
rozone budget. As it can be seen, Eurozone budget will be predominantly dependent on 
the Eurozone payroll tax since revenues from this tax equal to 54 % of the total budget. 
Contributions from national budgets of Eurozone member states are the second most 
important source of revenues. These contributions equal to 33.3 % of the total revenues 
                                                 
6 All the data, formulas and detailed calalculations can be found in the attachment of this 
working paper. 
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and also play an important role. The third and smallest revenue is represented by the 
tax from financial transactions and equals to 12.7 % of the total revenues. 
 
Figure 6: Share of individual sources of revenues in % 
Source: own elaboration 
4.3 Budget expenditures 
Eurozone budget expenditures are divided into two major parts. First part is unem-
ployment benefits paid out to unemployed people in member states. This part works as 
a classical annual budgetary expense. The unemployment scheme is designed to be bal-
anced which means that annual expense in terms of unemployment benefits is designed 
to be roughly the same as annual revenues collected from payroll tax. In other words, it 
can be stated that this scheme forms an autonomous part of the budget. Another part of 
the expenses is not standard budgetary expenses that happen to be paid out each year. 
In this part, financial resources will be accumulated up to the amount sufficient to pro-
vide financial aid and ensure liquidity of the member states during economic crisis. 
While determining the threshold up until which the resources are going to be accumu-
lated, size of the European stabilization mechanisms has been takes as a benchmark. So 
the size of the accumulated stabilization funds in the Eurozone budget therefore equals 
to the size of the European Stability Mechanism, namely 500 billion EUR. Since the 
Eurozone unemployment scheme is balanced on revenues and expenditures side and 
therefore autonomous, this Eurozone stabilization fund will be funded by the remain-
ing two Eurozone budget revenues, namely contributions of national budgets and tax 
from financial transactions. Given the ceteris paribus condition described in the meth-
odology of this working paper, it can be computed based on 2012 data that annually 
these two sources of revenues are equal to 132.2 billion EUR. If the movements of reve-
nues in individual years are omitted and figures from 2012 used, period after which the 
financial ceiling is reached can be calculated. The process of accumulation can be seen 
in the table 5. 
33,3%
54,0%
12,7% Contributions of
national budgets
Eurozone payroll tax
Tax from financial
transactions
Results 23 
Table 5: Accumulation of financial resources in Eurozone stabilization fund 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 
Annual contribution from Eurozone 
budget revenues in billion EUR 
132.2 132.2 132.2 132.2 132.2 
Resources accumulated in stabilization 
fund in billion EUR 
0 132.2 264.4 396.6 528.8 
Source: Own elaboration 
The table 5 shows that the threshold of 500 billion will be reached between year 4 and 
year 5 after the introduction of the Eurozone budget. Exactly it will be after 4.78 years. 
At that time, Eurozone stabilization mechanism will be filled up. The issue of further 
development of the Eurozone budget is tackled in the recommendations of the working 
paper where two scenarios are developed. 
4.3.1 Unemployment benefits 
Unemployment benefits are the most important Eurozone budget expenditure. They 
are designed in a way so that it should entirely replace the current unemployment 
benefits in the national level. The design is based on a study by European Commission 
that is described in the Literature review of this working paper. The study focuses on 
unemployment benefit schemes in individual states and based on the data it describes 
characteristics of an average European unemployment scheme. These data are also 
used in the quantification of the unemployment benefits in the Eurozone budget. 
Firstly, the number of unemployed people is computed based on population and 
unemployment in individual member states. According to the study mentioned above, 
the net average replacement rate is 60 % of the wage and the average length of unem-
ployment is 4 months. So the annual expenditures for unemployment benefits are cal-
culated as follows. The number of unemployed people is multiplied by average annual 
wage, net replacement of 60 % and average unemployment duration of four months.7 
From the figure 7 that shows the unemployment in Eurozone member states, it 
can be seen how unemployment in particular member states differs. This information is 
also used in recommendation of the working paper where the unemployment scheme is 
analyzed and the net gainers in form of unemployment support and net contributors in 
form of Eurozone payroll tax will be analyzed. Greece and Spain have by far the highest 
unemployment in Eurozone reaching values around 25 % which means that 25 % of the 
productive population in these two countries will be receiving unemployment support 
from the Eurozone budget. However, it is important to mention that from the point of 
view of the whole Eurozone, unemployment in smaller countries such as Greece does 
not have so big impact on the Eurozone economy as unemployment in big countries 
with high population such as Germany, Italy, France and Spain. If for example the un-
employment rises by 3 % in Germany, it has much larger impact on the Eurozone econ-
omy than 10 % increase of unemployment level in Greece since the absolute number of 
newly unemployed people in Germany is higher since the German population is enor-
                                                 
7 All the data, formulas and detailed calalculations can be found in the attachment of this 
working paper. 
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mous in comparison to the Greek population. When analyzing the impacts of increase 
in unemployment, absolute values of newly unemployed people should be taken into 
consideration rather than relative values in unemployment in individual member coun-
tries. 
It can be also seen that the differences in unemployment among the member 
states are enormous. The difference between the member state with the lowest unem-
ployment (Austria) and the one with the highest unemployment (Spain) exceeds 20 %. 
This is also an indicator that stabilization function is needed in Eurozone budgetary 
structures. 
 
Figure 7: Unemployment in Eurozone member states based on 2012 data 
Source: own elaboration 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of unemployment benefits per member state. Similarly 
to the revenue distribution form the payroll tax, there are four member states that con-
sume the majority of the unemployment benefits. These states are Spain, France, Italy 
and Germany and are identical to the states on the revenue part of the unemployment 
scheme because these countries are simply the largest in the Eurozone. These four 
countries consume more than 75 % of the total expenditures dedicated to unemploy-
ment benefits. However, it is important to mention that the shares of these for major 
contributors and receivers are different on the revenue side than on the expenditure 
side of the budgets and this is the key stabilization function of the budget. Again, this is 
described more in detail in the recommendation of this working paper. 
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Figure 8: Share of expenditures for unemployment benefits per member state in % 
Source: own elaboration 
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5 Recommendations 
5.1 Eurozone payroll tax and unemployment benefits 
Unemployment benefits are the most important expenditure of the Eurozone budget. 
One of the reasons for it is that it is an effective tool for performing a stabilization func-
tion in case when an asymmetric shock occurs within the Eurozone. In case of an 
asymmetric shock, some member countries experience an economic boom and on the 
other hand some member countries experience economic recession. Economic boom is 
connected with high employment and in contrast economic recession is connected with 
high unemployment. In case, there was no Eurozone payroll tax and no Eurozone un-
employment benefits, member states experiencing economic boom would increase their 
revenues from payroll tax due to higher employment and decrease the expenditures 
needed for unemployment support due to decreased unemployment. So this member 
state would improve its economic situation and decrease its government debt. Exactly 
opposite scenario would occur in the member state that would be hit by an economic 
recession. The unemployment would rise meaning higher expenditures would be need-
ed to be paid out to unemployed people and simultaneously; revenues from payroll tax 
would be decreased. 
As a result of this the state experiencing economic boom would be better off 
than before and the state experiencing recession would be in economic troubles with 
increasing government debt. This would cause increasing discrepancies among individ-
ual Eurozone member states and increasing heterogeneity among the Eurozone mem-
ber states which is of course not good since the countries use one common currency 
and therefore should be as homogeneous as possible to be able to pursue a unitary 
common monetary policy. 
Common Eurozone payroll tax and common system of unemployment benefits 
can in fact bring stability to the Eurozone and reduce the impact of asymmetric shock 
within the Eurozone and thereby contribute to less heterogeneity among the individual 
member states of the Eurozone. This is the primary reason why this system was em-
bedded as a mile stone of the designed Eurozone budget. If such system is introduced 
on the Eurozone level, following stabilization function in case of an asymmetric shock 
will be achieved. The country experiencing economic boom will, due to the increased 
employment, contribute more to the common Eurozone budget since the revenues col-
lected from the payroll tax will be higher and simultaneously this country will need less 
unemployment benefits from the budget. So such a country becomes net contributor to 
the system of unemployment benefits. On the other hand, the country experiencing 
recession will be able to obtain more money in form of the unemployment benefits 
from the common budget without the necessity of increasing the national debt because 
the increase demand for the unemployment benefits in one country will be compen-
sated by increase supply of revenues from the payroll tax in another country. This is in 
short the principle of stabilization function embedded in the Eurozone unemployment 
scheme. 
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The scheme is designed based on scientific articles, proposals of the European 
authorities, and statistical data from Eurozone member countries. It is designed to be 
balanced and therefore the revenues from the payroll tax computed in the revenue sec-
tion of this working paper reach 155.1 billion EUR and expenditures for unemployment 
benefits reach 147.6 billion EUR. Small buffer of 7.5 billion EUR was created for possi-
ble deviations from statistical calculations in the real situation. 
Figure 9 compares share of expenditures for unemployment benefits of member 
states which is denoted by blue color and share of payroll tax revenues collected by in-
dividual members of the Eurozone. Since both revenues and expenditures are almost 
equal and the sub-budget of the unemployment scheme is balanced, these two variables 
can be easily compared. Figure 17 shows that in both expenditures and revenues 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain are the key contributors and consumers. However it 
is interesting to see that role of these states are not the same. France and Italy have 
more or less the same share on both revenues and expenditures. On the other hand, 
revenues collected in Germany are approximately twice larger than benefits consumed. 
This is due to the fact that the unemployment in Germany is low. In contrast, Spain 
consumes almost three times more unemployment benefits than it collects in form of 
payroll tax. Again this is due to an extreme unemployment in Spain. In order to simpli-
fy the whole scenario, it can be stated that the excess of payroll tax revenues over un-
employment benefits in Germany is used to cover part of unemployment benefits in 
Spain since Spain is due to high unemployment not able to collects as much revenues 
from payroll tax as it is needed. It is a practical example of the stabilization function in 
the Eurozone budget. 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of payroll tax revenues and unemployment benefits expenditures per 
member state in % 
Source: own elaboration 
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If we look at other member states except the four major players, there is a similar sce-
nario of the Netherlands, Greece and Ireland where the excess of collected revenues 
from the payroll tax in the Netherlands roughly matches Greek and Irish excess of 
money needed to pay out unemployment benefits combined. Here it is again important 
to mention that increase of unemployment in countries with small population does not 
play so important role as an increase in most populous countries such as Germany, Ita-
ly, France and Spain where only a mild increase in unemployment represents bug 
amount of newly unemployed workers in absolute terms. From this point of view, Span-
ish unemployment represents the biggest threat for the Eurozone economy since Spain 
has a productive population of almost 31 million and 25 % level of unemployment 
which means that in Spain, there are 7.8 million unemployed which is more than the 
entire productive population of Greece. 
Figure 10 shows the net gainers and net contributors of the Eurozone unem-
ployment scheme in billion EUR. Negative values in the left side of the figure mean, 
that given member state collects more money from the payroll tax then amount of 
money needed for unemployment benefits. These countries can be called net contribu-
tors to the Eurozone unemployment scheme. By analogy, the positive values in the fig-
ure 18 mean that the country consumes more money for unemployment benefits than 
amount of money collected by the payroll tax. 
 
Figure 10: Difference between unemployment benefits received and payroll tax paid per mem-
ber state in EUR billions 
Source: own elaboration 
It can be seen that many Eurozone countries (Slovakia, Malta, Luxembourg, Latvia, 
Italy etc.) do not have a substantial positive or negative balance in the unemployment 
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scheme. On the other hand, Germany and Spain have the most unbalanced figures, 
Germany being the biggest net contributor with 23.6 billion EUR and Spain being the 
biggest net gainer with 26.4 billion EUR. 
Another important fact to be mentioned is that all countries except Italy often 
called PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) are practically the only net 
gainers of the unemployment scheme. This is also a proof that unemployment scheme 
designed in this working paper is in fact able to provide stabilization function in times 
of economic crisis and effectively transfer financial resources from countries not suffer-
ing so much from the crisis to countries that are really badly affected by an economic 
downturn and thereby help stabilize their economies and economy of the whole Euro-
zone. 
5.2 Solving only temporary asymmetric shocks 
Taking into consideration the position net gainers and net contributors, it is important 
to stress out that stabilization function of the Eurozone budget is designed to tackle 
only temporary asymmetric shocks. Especially for Germany being by far the biggest net 
contributor, it is crucial to emphasize that financial transfers have only temporary 
character and solve only temporary asymmetric shocks. Otherwise it would be very dif-
ficult if not impossible to accept such transfers by the voters and public in the member 
states that are net contributors. This would of course hinder stabilization processes in 
the Eurozone because without political will no changes can be enforced. 
Net contributors need to be assured that for example the unemployment in 
Spain is not going to be permanent which would mean that Spain would become per-
manent net gainer from the Eurozone unemployment scheme. This can be achieved by 
required reforms of labor market similar to so called Hartz labor market reforms car-
ried out in Germany from the year 2003 and onwards. These reforms included estab-
lishment of Staff Service agencies and job centers, support of further education, new 
types of employment, grants to entrepreneurs, and reform of unemployment and social 
benefits. Concrete suggestions for implementing such changes into the Spanish envi-
ronment are out of the scope of this working paper but it is important to emphasize that 
some reforms need to be performed in member states that are net gainers in the Euro-
zone budget in order to ensure that transfers from net contributors will not be perma-
nent. The question for the further research could also be how to ensure that competi-
tiveness o the net gainers is improving and who or which institution should be respon-
sible for the supervision of such process. Should a position of Eurozone minister of fi-
nance be created who would supervise national reforms of the member states? Or 
should the net contributors have a right to control reforms of net gainers? A further 
research to answer these questions would be needed and it would be a good comple-
ment to this working paper. (29) 
Another tool how to ensure that the financial transfers from one member state 
to another are not permanent is to improve competitiveness in net gainers by attracting 
foreign direct investments and providing investments incentives. This is more in detail 
described in the next paragraphs where two scenarios of the Eurozone budget are de-
scribed. 
30 Results 
5.3 Two scenarios after filling up the stabilization fund 
As it is written the part of this working paper where the expenditures of the Eurozone 
budget are described, there is a stabilization fund in the amount of 500 billion EUR to 
be filled up with contributions of the budgets of individual member states and from the 
revenues gained by the tax from financial transactions. It was computed that the stabi-
lization fund is going to be filled up after approximately 4.8 years after introduction of 
the Eurozone budget. After filling up this fund, a question arises what is going to hap-
pen with revenues previously used for filling up this fund. In order to answer this ques-
tion, two scenarios have been created and described in the following paragraphs. It is 
also important to mention that detailed analysis of the impact of particular scenarios is 
out of the scope of this working paper. The following paragraphs should be perceived as 
suggested recommendation or inspiration for further research. 
5.3.1 First scenario: abolishing contributions from national 
budgets after reaching necessary stabilization ceiling 
The first scenario supports lean budgetary structures. From this reason, the contribu-
tions from national budgets will be abolished right after filling up the Eurozone stabili-
zation fund in order to decrease the burden of national budgets of member states. 
However, there still will be one source or revenue left, namely the tax from financial 
transactions. This tax does not play a key role in the revenue structure of the Eurozone 
budget. But when once already introduced and implemented, it does not make much 
sense to cancel such tax just after the stabilization fund is filled. Therefore, in this sce-
nario, tax from financial transactions will be further used for improving competitive-
ness of net gainers and thereby preventing the financial transfers to be permanent.  
Unemployment could be decreased by attracting foreign direct investments 
(FDI) into the countries. Attracting FDI requires providing investment incentives and 
giving so called tax holidays to the foreign investors. And this should be the use of the 
revenues from the tax from financial transactions. Revenues should be used for provid-
ing investment incentives and reimbursing the member states for uncollected tax reve-
nues due to the provision of tax holiday to foreign investors. Annual revenues from the 
tax from financial transactions are computed to be 36.5 billion EUR annually. It is not a 
very high amount of money to improve competitiveness of net gainers but since this is a 
scenario of lean budget, it is at least some financial resources available for fighting 
against permanent financial transfers within the Eurozone budget. 
5.3.2 Second scenario: permanent contributions from national 
budgets 
In the second scenario, both contributions from national budgets and tax from financial 
transactions will be used for improving competitiveness of the net gainers and prevent-
ing permanent transfers within the Eurozone budget. The amount of available financial 
resources in this scenario is much higher. Annually, it amounts to 132.2 billion EUR 
annually. Therefore, resources could be also invested in so called “Trans-European” 
networks that would increase for example labor mobility so that it would be easier for 
people to work abroad and therefore the asymmetric shocks would be smaller. 
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6 Discussion and conclusion 
6.1 Discussion 
In the discussion part of this working paper theoretical concepts and scientific articles 
related to a stabilization function are confronted with and compared to the designed 
budget of the Eurozone. Firstly, it is necessary to say, that in accordance to the theory 
of fiscal federalism the stabilization function of the budget should be centralized, 
should include automatic stabilizers and should help overcome asymmetric shocks in 
individual states of the federation. The theory however supposes that firstly a federa-
tion is created and then subsequently the federal budget according to the principle “no 
taxation without representation”. The process of creating a federation would also be a 
possible topic for further research. 
The designed Eurozone budget is indeed centralized on the European level, 
namely on the level of monetary union called Eurozone. The budget includes automatic 
stabilizers that help the economy overcome fluctuations in output. The stabilizers are 
represented by the designed unemployment scheme that is autonomous on both on the 
side of revenues and expenditures. If there is an economic boom, revenues in terms of 
payroll tax are going to be increased and on the other hand in terms of recession ex-
penditures represented by unemployment benefits are going to be increased. This helps 
smoothen the business cycle in the Eurozone. Last but not least, Eurozone budget also 
helps overcome asymmetric shocks within the Eurozone. For this purpose transfers 
among individual member states are introduced both in the unemployment scheme 
where some states have a role of net gainers and some of net contributors as well as in 
the concept of contributions of national budgets where principle of solidarity is applied 
and richer member states contribute more than poorer member states. 
Various scientific articles describe the necessity of aggregate approach to budg-
eting in Europe. In the literature review of this working paper, there is an example 
comparing a degree of spending in various fields on a central level in Europe, USA, 
Canada and Switzerland. In all observed fields, European budgetary structures are far 
less centralized as in the other countries. Figure 1 shows that in Europe, spending of 
social welfare programs are entirely financed on local or national levels. This situation 
is improved in the Eurozone budget by centralizing the unemployment scheme, intro-
ducing Eurozone payroll tax and Eurozone unemployment benefits. 
In this working paper, scientific articles about recent economic crisis and its in-
fluence on the EU budget have been researched and described. However, it is important 
to mention that budget of the European Union has never been designed to pursue a 
stabilization function. Moreover, since the EU budget has been approved for the next 
budgetary period of 2014 to 2020 and there is very little political will to pursue any 
changes, the author decided to apply some of these recommendations to the Eurozone 
budget. For the budget of the EU, it was recommended to establish some common Eu-
ropean tax. The articles often spoke about common corporate income tax or common 
personal income tax. None of these two recommendations have been implemented to 
the Eurozone budget because there is so big heterogeneity among individual income tax 
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systems, tax bases, tax rates etc. in the individual member countries that establishing of 
common personal or corporate income tax would be extremely complicated if not im-
possible to quantify. Furthermore, common income tax could not be easily and duly 
implemented to the big diversity and also to no political will of member countries to 
give the responsibility of such importance to the European level. Instead of creating 
common personal or corporate income tax, common Eurozone payroll tax has been 
designed and plays the key role of the Eurozone budget. 
Stabilization funds in Europe and protecting of member states from defaulting 
was another topic that often described in up to date scientific articles. This principle 
was also taken into consideration while designing the Eurozone budget. There are two 
sources of revenues, namely the contributions from the national budgets and tax from 
financial transactions that are used for creating the Eurozone stabilization fund. Ac-
cording to the author’s opinion, it is better to include such stabilization funds directly 
into European budgetary structures rather than creating a fund with self identity and 
financing because net contributors such as Germany will never agree with issuing 
common Eurobonds without creating a common Ministry of Finance that would be 
entitled to influence national fiscal policies. While establishing the size of the Eurozone 
stabilization fund, currently existing European Stability mechanism was taken as a 
benchmark and from this benchmark a value of 500 billion EUR for the Eurozone sta-
bilization fund was taken. 
In the literature review of this working paper, one important theoretical aspect 
is written and emphasized. It says that it is of a great importance to ensure that in the 
long run, there are no net gainers and net contributors within the budget and that the 
transfers among the states should solve only temporary economic shocks. This crucial 
theoretical background is also considered in the Eurozone budget. In order to prevent 
transfers and asymmetric shocks from being permanent, competitiveness of the net 
gainers needs to be improved. After filling up the Eurozone stabilization fund, part of 
the revenues of the Eurozone budget will be used for improving competitiveness of the 
net gainers and two scenarios have been developed in the recommendations of this 
working paper. 
European Commission has issued a proposal for the tax from the financial 
transactions for 11 member states of the European Union. This proposal and principle 
of the tax from financial transactions have been implemented into the Eurozone budget 
as a source of revenue and revenues recalculated for the whole Eurozone. 
While establishing the size of the Eurozone budget, two benchmarks have been 
considered. The first one is the Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance 
in European Integration, more commonly known as so called MacDougal report. The 
report was prepared for the European Commission and contains information about 
minimal size of the budget that should perform stabilization function, namely 2 % of 
the GDP. Second benchmark used for determining the size of the budget was current 
European stabilization mechanisms. Based on these two benchmarks the size of the 
Eurozone budget was determined. 
Also the unemployment scheme of the Eurozone budget was confronted with the 
theoretical background, concretely with a study of European Commission about unem-
ployment benefits in the EU member states. Despite the fact that the unemployment 
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benefits differ substantially in individual member states, averages have been used in 
order to design unemployment scheme of the Eurozone budget. The fact that there are 
big differences in unemployment benefits in member states in many aspects as it is de-
scribed in chapter 3.8 might actually create problems in implementation of the Euro-
zone unemployment scheme because for some member states, Eurozone unemploy-
ment scheme will be too generous for the unemployed people and for some member 
states in will not be generous enough compared to nowadays existing national unem-
ployment schemes. Therefore, unemployment schemes in individual member states 
would have to be harmonized before the implementation of the common Eurozone un-
employment scheme which could be also an interesting topic for the further research. 
6.2 Conclusion 
The goal of this working paper was to design a structure of a budget of the Eurozone 
that would perform a stabilization function during economic and financial crisis in or-
der to provide stabilization mechanisms to be able to address asymmetric shocks. 
Since the topic of this working paper is very broad, complicated and touches 
many spheres of the economy, the goal of the working paper was achieved und number 
of limiting conditions. Firstly, this working paper is focused exclusively on the stabiliza-
tion function of the budget and allocation and redistribution functions are not taken 
into account while designing the Eurozone budget. Secondly, this working paper is not 
addressing impacts of the Eurozone budgets on individual member states, their nation-
al economies, taxation systems, unemployment schemes and similar economic systems 
that would be influenced by the Eurozone budget because such research would be way 
beyond the scope of the working paper. Thirdly, a principle of ceteris paribus is applied 
in this working paper and the design of the Eurozone budget is based on the data from 
the year 2012 which is the most recent year with the available data. Changes and future 
development of individual variables and indicators such as unemployment rate, aver-
age wage etc. are omitted and all values are considered to be constant because calculat-
ing with possible development of individual variables in every single member state of 
the Eurozone would also be beyond the scope of this working paper. However, it is very 
important to emphasize that the actual data used in this working paper are not the 
most important aspect. It is the methodology and the design of individual revenues and 
expenditures itself that is the biggest contribution of this working paper. In the meth-
odology, the author has exactly described steps that are taken to design the Eurozone 
budget and this process represents the added value. The data change and develop over 
the time, but the methodology and structure of the budget described in this working 
paper can be used over and over again with new data set and thereby the budget can be 
updated to the most recent economic data. Furthermore, an excel file containing all the 
data, mathematical formulas and figures is attached to this working paper so it would 
be very easy to perform further research with up-to-date data since the data would be 
just copied into the prepared tables and the whole budget including charts would be 
recalculated automatically. 
In order to fulfill this goal, main principles of budgeting under the theory of fis-
cal federalism are described in the literature section of this working paper. Moreover, 
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relevant up-to-date scientific articles and monographs have been stated in the literature 
review in order to gather knowledge and background of the budgetary integration in 
Europe, its aims, problems and suggestions. All of these articles have been taken into 
account while designing the Eurozone budget. There are three sources of revenues of 
the Eurozone budget, namely contributions from national budgets, Eurozone payroll 
tax and tax from financial transactions. The contributions of national budgets represent 
one third of total budget revenues and contributions of individual member states can 
be seen in figure 3 of this working paper. It is also important to say that this source of 
revenues includes a principle of solidarity embedded in the European Treaties. The 
principle of solidarity is represented by a coefficient of contribution that is described in 
section 5.2.1 of this working paper. 
The second revenue is Eurozone payroll tax and represents more than one half 
of the total revenues as it can be seen in figure 14 and therefore it is the most important 
source of revenues. The contribution of individual states is highly dependent on unem-
ployment rate and average wage as described in section 5.2.2. The last revenue is the 
tax from financial transactions, contributing almost 13 % of the total revenues. 
Regarding the budget expenditures, unemployment benefits play the key role 
and perform the key stabilization function of the Eurozone budget. Figure 10 clearly 
depicts net gainers and net contributors of the Eurozone budget. From the figure 10, it 
can be derived that Germany is by far the biggest net contributor and on the other hand 
Spain is by far the biggest net gainer of the budget. In simple words and with a high 
degree of simplification, it can be said that the budget introduces an outflow of finan-
cial resources from Germany and inflow of financial resources in Spain, as it is seen in 
figure 10. However, it is crucial to mention that according to the literature review, espe-
cially section 3.4, it is necessary to ensure, that financial transfers among member 
states are not permanent and that only temporary asymmetric shocks should be tack-
led. This issue was solved by using the revenues of the Eurozone budget for improving 
competitiveness of the net gainers by attracting foreign direct investment into these 
countries. Firstly, the part of the revenues is used for creating the Eurozone stabiliza-
tion fund as it is written in section 5.3 and after the stabilization fund of 500 bil-
lion EUR is filled, revenues will be used for improving the competitiveness of net gain-
ers and thereby ensuring that the financial transfers are not going to be permanent. In 
order to support the competitiveness of the net gainers, two scenarios have been devel-
oped in section 6.3. However it is important to say that these scenarios should be con-
sidered to be only a suggestion since their detailed elaboration is out of the scope of this 
working paper.  
All in all it can be stated, that this working paper designs a balanced budget of 
the Eurozone whose primary aim is to perform the stabilization function and fighting 
the asymmetric shocks within the Eurozone. The recent financial and economic crisis 
has proven that this function is currently missing in the European budgetary structures 
and the design of the Eurozone budget conducted in this working paper provides a sug-
gestion how such function could be embedded into European budgetary structures, 
what would be the best possible sources of revenues and expenditures in order to en-
sure stabilization function and what member states of the Eurozone would be the net 
gainers and contributors of such budgets. Furthermore, it outlines some suggestion 
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how to solve the issue of permanent financial transfers from net contributors to net 
gainers.  
Further research should be primarily focused on harmonization of unemploy-
ment schemes in individual member states and more detailed elaboration of suggested 
Eurozone unemployment scheme and more exact quantification of revenues and ex-
penditures of such scheme. Also a process of federalization of Eurozone should be re-
searched more in detail because according to the theory a federation should be created 
before creating a common budget. Last but not least, exact process of improving the 
competitiveness of the net gainers of Eurozone budget should be analyzed in order to 
have a concrete plan how to ensure that financial transfers from net contributors to net 
gainers are not going to be permanent. This working paper could be also further elabo-
rated by increasing the emphasis on stabilization function and including even more 
stabilizers such as potential economic growth of individual member countries that 
would serve as another weight for contributions so that the states severely affected by a 
negative economic shock would not contribute as much as under this proposal. 
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